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Eliminating Mandatory Minimum Sentences:
Putting Sentencing Power Back in the Hands of
the Judiciary
Hunter Anderson1 and Joseph Dummar2
Ron Miller had been a general manager of a company for twentyfour years with no criminal record when his best friend asked
him to allow a shipment of drugs to be delivered to his company’s
address. Ron reluctantly agreed to help his friend, who was desperate for money. Before the drugs arrived, Ron backed out and asked
his friend not to send the drugs, but by that point the shipment had
already been made. The police tracked the shipment to Ron and
arrested him. Even though Ron never knew the type nor the quantity of drug that was delivered to his company, the judge of Ron’s
trial was required to base Ron’s sentence on mandatory minimum
sentencing laws. Ron was unable to trade information for a lesser
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sentence because he played such a small role in the crime and he
received a ten-year prison sentence.3
The sentencing judge stated the mandatory sentence had created
a “vicious circle” because small crime players, like Ron, were getting long sentences, without any information to trade for a lower sentence because of his minor involvement.4 Thousands of people with
no criminal record and minimal involvement in drug crimes have
been sentenced to extensive time in prison without chance of parole
under mandatory sentencing laws.5 This paper will discuss the history and consequences of mandatory minimum sentences (MMS),
specifically in the realm of non-violent drug offenses. We will discuss the inefficiencies that result from MMS and suggest reform to
addresses these shortcomings.

I. Background
Since their inception, the legislature has often used mandatory minimum sentences as a decisive tool to quell public fear. Congress first
instituted MMS in 17906 in response to the national crisis of piracy.
The second round of federal MMS laws came during the Civil War,
when Congress passed legislation requiring all Confederate spies to
be killed upon conviction.7 It wasn’t until the turn of the 20th century,
that a commission suggested the elimination of most MMS laws and
3

Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Mandatory sentencing was once
America’s law-and-order panacea. Here’s why it’s not working., Families
Against Mandatory Minimums, 8, (Feb. 21, 2020, 11:47 PM). https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/famm/Primer.pdf.

4

Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Mandatory sentencing was once
America’s law-and-order panacea. Here’s why it’s not working., Families
Against Mandatory Minimums, 8, (Feb. 21, 2020, 11:47 PM). https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/famm/Primer.pdf.

5

Lauren-Brooke & Inimai Chettiar, 39% of Prisoners Should Not Be in
Prison, TIME (Feb. 2, 2020, 11:55 PM), https://time.com/4596081/incarceration-report/.

6

Crimes Act, H.R. Chap. IX , 1 Stat. 112 (1790).

7

The Confiscation Act, S. ch. XXV, § 4, 12 (1862) Stat. 339, 340.
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many were repealed.8 During the 1900s, drug abuse became more
prominent, and widespread outcry grew. Although they had been
inefficient in the past, Congress once again turned to MMS laws in
response to public fears. In 1951 and 1970, legislation was passed
that required certain drug crimes to carry mandatory sentences.9
In 1975, a bill was introduced that would authorize the creation
of a commission purposed with creating sentencing guidelines for
judges. Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act (1984), which created the United
States Sentencing Commission (USSC).10 The USSC established
federal sentencing guidelines that take into consideration factors
relating “both to the subjective guilt of the defendant and to the harm
caused by his facts.”11 The USSC cited sentencing disparity, lack
of certainty of punishment and crime control as the judicial shortcomings which merited the creation of the sentencing guidelines.12
Although the guidelines are not strictly mandatory, judges are
required to consider them when issuing sentences. If a judge decides
to increase or decrease the sentence from what the guidelines suggest, they must state in open court what “aggravating or mitigating
circumstances” warranted the departure.13

8

The United States Sentencing Commision, History of Mandatory Minimum Penalties And Statutory Relief Mechanisms, 18 (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_02.pdf.

9

Id.

10

Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 98th Cong., 1762, (1984) (enacted).

11

Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Cornell Law School (Feb. 22, 2020, 12:55
AM), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/federal_sentencing_guidelines.

12

United State Sentencing Commission, An Overview of the United State
Sentencing Commission, 1 (Feb. 27, 2020, 12:57 AM), https://www.ussc.
gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/USSC_Overview.pdf.

13

Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 98th Cong., 1762, (1984) (enacted).
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The creation of the USSC and implementation of federal sentencing guidelines did not solve the growing drug abuse problem.14
In the 1980s, many still feared that drug abuse could affect their
homes, schools, and communities.15 The country was shocked when
Len Bias died from a cocaine overdose in the summer of 1986, only
two days after being drafted by the Boston Celtics.16 Congress, facing immense pressure to address the public fear of drug abuse, acted
as they had in the past and quickly enacted strict legislation.17 While
a typical bill takes one to two years to become law from the time it is
introduced,18 the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 became law just five
months after the death of Bias.19 Years after its passage, the principal
drafting attorney of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act expressed his regret

14

More Imprisonment Does Not Reduce State Drug Problems, PEW (Feb.
27, 2020, 12:55 AM), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
issue-briefs/2018/03/more-imprisonment-does-not-reduce-state-drugproblems.

15

Jennifer Robison, Decades of Drug Use: The ‘80s and ‘90s, Gallup Poll
(Mar. 7, 2020, 9:18 AM), https://news.gallup.com/poll/6352/decadesdrug-use-80s-90s.aspx.

16

Mike Frandsen, Remembering Maryland Basketball Star Len Bias, The
Bleacher Report (Feb. 27, 2020, 12:58 AM), https://bleacherreport.com/
articles/1230358-remembering-maryland-basketball-star-len-bias.

17

Deborah J. Vagins & Jesselyn McCurdy, Cracks in the System: Twenty
Years of the Unjust Federal Crack Cocaine Law, Cracks in the System,
The American Civil Liberties Union 1, (October 2006),. https://www.aclu.
org/sites/default/files/pdfs/drugpolicy/cracksinsystem_20061025.pdf

18

Statistics and Historical Comparison, Gov Track (Feb. 27, 2020, 1:03
AM), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics.

19

Anti-Drug Abuse Act, H.R.5484, 99th Cong. (1986) (Sterling, the drafting
attorney of the Anti-Drug and Abuse Act said that Congress “…had no
hearings. We did not consult with the Bureau of Prisons, or with the federal judiciary, or with DEA, or with the Justice Department, to at least find
out from those folks what would be the effect of mandatory minimums.”);
Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug
Sentencing, The Atlantic (Mar. 7, 2020, 9:40 AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-toughon-crime-drug-sentencing/360983/.
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for being involved in the hasty process, and claimed that the bill
”had been the worst legislation [he’d] ever been involved with.”20
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act created MMS based on drug type and
quantity. An individual convicted of trafficking 100 grams or more
of heroin would face a minimum sentence of five years.21 The trafficking of one kilo or more of heroin would increase the sentence to
a minimum of ten-years.22 The minimum sentences are enhanced if
the trafficker had prior drug felony convictions, or if death or serious
injury resulted from the drug offense.23 Other minimum sentences
were created for crimes involving powder cocaine, crack cocaine,
marijuana, and other drugs.
The safety valve provision was created to allow certain first-time
drug offenders to be exempted from extreme MMS. Individuals who
meet specific criteria may qualify for a sentence below the statutory
minimum. The defendant must have no or a limited criminal history,
the crime must be non-violent, the crime must not result in death
or serious bodily injury, the defendant must not be an organizer in
the offense, and the defendant must cooperate by truthfully providing all known information concerning the crime.24 Although there
are many first-time offenders charged with drug offenses that carry
MMS, very few are eligible for a reduced sentence. In 2015, only
13% of drug offenders qualified for the safety valve provision.25
Near the beginning of the 21st century, critics began to speak in
opposition to MMS. A law professor said: “the weight of the evidence
20

Mary-Jayne McKay, More Than They Deserve Judges Protest Mandatory
Sentencing In Drug Cases, 60 Minuets (Feb. 27, 2020, 1:10 AM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/more-than-they-deserve/.

21

Mandatory Minimum Sentencing of Federal Drug Offenses, Every CRS
Report, (Jan. 28, 2020, 6:26pm), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/
R45074.html#_Ref503372497.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Federal Sentencing Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1987).

25

Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Safety Valves, Families Against
Mandatory Minimums (Feb. 27, 2020, 7:39 PM), https://famm.org/ourwork/u-s-congress/safety-valves/.
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clearly shows that enactment of mandatory penalties has either no
demonstrable marginal deterrent effects or short-term effects that
rapidly waste away.”26 Others that spoke against MMS postulated
that they removed discretionary power from the hands of judges
and created a proportionality disparity between the offender and the
sentence, resulting in low-level offenders often receiving extremely
harsh sentences.27 It wasn’t until 2010 that Congress responded by
passing considerable reformative legislation. The Fair Sentencing
Act made significant changes to MMS.28 The penalty for simple possession of crack cocaine was repealed, and the crack cocaine quantity threshold for five and ten-year MMS was increased. From 1993
to 2013, over 60% of drug offenders were convicted of an offense
carrying a MMS. In 2014, the percentage began to drop. In 2016,
it had fallen to 46.8%.29 It is unclear if the decrease in convictions
carrying MMS can be completely explained by the Fair Sentencing
Act, although the increased quantity thresholds certainly resulted in
a reduction of the federal prison population.30

26

Michael Tonry, Mandatory Penalties, in 243, The University of Chicago
Press Journals, (1992).

27

Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Mandatory sentencing was once
America’s law-and-order panacea. Here’s why it’s not working., Families
Against Mandatory Minimums, 5, (Feb. 21, 2020, 11:47 PM). https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/famm/Primer.pdf.

28

The United States Sentencing Commission, 2015 Report to the Congress:
Impact of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, The United States Sentencing
Commission (Feb. 27, 2020, 8:10 PM), https://www.ussc.gov/research/
congressional-reports/2015-report-congress-impact-fair-sentencingact-2010.

29

Id.

30

Gregory Midgette & Steven Davenport & Jonathan P. Caulkins AND
Beau Kilmer, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 2006–2016,
RAND Corporation (Mar. 9, 2020, 7:44 PM), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR3140.html (The decrease in convictions carrying an
MMS could partially be the result of a general shift away from cocaine
(which has strict MMS enforcement) to marijuana use (which has much
lighter penalties)).
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The First Step Act (2019) is the most recent piece of legislation
that reformed MMS.31 It primarily focused on improving prison
conditions for inmates, increasing their ability to earn time towards
an early release for good behavior, and expanding the safety valve
provision, potentially allowing for more low-level drug offenders to receive reduced sentences. Some MMS were also shortened.
For example, conviction of a felony drug offense that used to carry
a 20-year minimum sentence was reduced to 15 years.32 It additionally created new programs that seek to rehabilitate offenders
through means other than imprisonment.33 In the summer of 2019,
the Department of Justice announced that 3,100 inmates would be
released and 1,691 sentences had been reduced due to the First Step
Act.34 Currently, there is not adequate data available to measure the
extent to which the First Step Act is affecting current prisoners and
new drug offenders. Nonetheless, this reform marks a large step in
the right direction.
The scope of this paper is limited to discussing the MMS laws
for non-violent drug crimes. The remainder of the paper details the
inefficiencies and faults created by the loss of judicial discretion. We
argue that MMS involving drug offenses should be eliminated. We
will show that eliminating them will restore discretionary power to
31

The United States Sentencing Commision, History of Mandatory Minimum Penalties And Statutory Relief Mechanisms, 18 (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_02.pdf.

32

United States Sentencing Commission, First Step Act Signed Into
Law, 2, (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/
newsletters/2019-special_FIRST-STEP-Act.pdf.

33

Federal Buero of Prisons, An Overview of the First Step Act, Federal
Buero of Prisons (Feb. 27, 2020, 8:17 PM), https://www.bop.gov/inmates/
fsa/overview.jsp.

34

Office of Public Affairs, Department Of Justice Announces the Release of
3,100 Inmates Under First Step Act, Publishes Risk And Needs Assessment
System, The Department Of Justice (Feb. 27, 2020, 8:20 PM), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-release-3100-inmates-under-first-step-act-publishes-risk-and.

120

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 34, 2020

the judiciary when sentencing. We propose a course of action for the
reformation of the federal sentencing guidelines. Judges will take these
non-binding guidelines into account when determining sentences.

II. Restoring Judicial Discretionary Power
Current reform has not been enough to resolve the problems created by the Anti-Drug Act. MMS restrict judges from exercising
judicial discretion. After defining judicial discretion, the myriad
of resulting problems will be discussed, including sentencing disparity and unduly harsh punishments, the unintentional transfer of
discretionary power from judges to prosecutors, and the damaging
effects of MMS on the US federal prison system. Notwithstanding the arguments that advocates cite to justify MMS, in the case
of non-violent drug offenses, the costs far outweigh the benefits.
Decisions on sentencing should be made by judges and not by legislators or prosecutors.
A. Judicial Discretion
The first substantial effect of MMS that we will address is the loss
of judicial discretion. The other shortcomings and problems that
will be discussed would be resolved by restoring the judiciary’s discretionary power. Judicial discretion is defined as “a judge’s power
to make decisions based on fairness or a weighing of the facts and
circumstances.”35 In other words, judges are able to give more personalized rulings by taking into consideration all available information. It must be well understood what the limits of judicial discretion
are. Chief Justice John Marshall said, “Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge, always
for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in
other words, to the will of the law.”36 Judges do not have the power
35

Judicial Discretion, Cornell Law School, (Feb. 21, 2020, 11:16 PM),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/judicial_discretion.

36

Thomas A. Zonay, Judicial Discretion: Ten Guidelines for Its Use, The
National Judicial College (Feb. 27, 2020, 8:27 PM), https://www.judges.
org/judicial-discretion-ten-guidelines-for-its-use/.
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to choose to disregard the law, but rather ensure that it is effected
properly.
The practicality of discretion is illustrated by the following
example of a mother with two sons. One is very extroverted and
loves to spend time with his friends. The other child is introverted and
prefers to spend his free time watching TV. Both children skip class,
and the mother finds out. Because the mother knows her children
well, she is aware of the most effective approach to punishing them.
She may restrict her extroverted child from seeing his friends and
keep her introverted child from using the television. A third party, who
does not know the individual children, might suggest that the mother
use the same punishment for both children. Because they are so different, using the same punishment would not effectively discipline
both children. This simple example shows the vital role discretionary power plays when applying punishments to unique individuals.
In the example of the mother, her discretion was used to decide
the best punishment for her children. In our legal system, judicial
discretion is used both in sentencing and interpreting the law. The
degree to which judicial discretion may be exercised when interpreting a law is dependent on the specificity of the relevant statute. Laws
that are strict and narrow leave little room for a judge’s interpretation. Conversely, broad laws that simply prohibit unsafe behavior,
without making further specifications on what practices constitute
unsafe conduct, leave it to the judiciary to determine what actions
are considered breaking the law. For instance, a law that simply
stipulates safe driving gives little to no direction to judges in how
to interpret the law. However, if multiple judges begin to rule that
texting and driving is unsafe, a legal precedent will be established.
The precedent grows stronger or more binding as more judges rule
similarly. Because the judiciary aims for a standard of consistency,
a judge is unlikely to rule in contrary to a precedent that has already
been established by many judges.37
The legislature will often pass clear and specific laws to preserve consistency in the legal system. By doing so, they establish a
37

ISU Law School, The Importance of Precedent, ISU (Mar. 3, 2020, 8:52
PM), https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/TheImportanceofPrecedent.html.

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 34, 2020

122

binding precedent to which the judiciary must adhere. Historically,
the legislation defining drug offenses has been quite strict; this was
true even before Congress passed the Anti-Drug Act. There was
not much room for judges to use their discretion when determining
whether or not a certain action was a drug crime.38 However, judges
were still able to exercise their discretion when issuing sentences for
drug offenses before the implementation of MMS.39
B. Sentencing Disparity
By establishing mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug
crimes, Congress established control over a significant part of the
judicial process and took away the judiciary’s ability to exercise discretion when sentencing.40 Advocates of MMS argue that one reason
Congress passed the Anti-Drug Act was to eliminate sentencing disparity.41 The principle of sentencing disparity is illustrated by the following example. If all judges punished the criminal offense of arson
with five years in prison, a strong precedent would exist. It would
become common knowledge that anyone convicted of arson would
receive a five-year sentence. However, sentencing disparity would
exist if some judges began to sentence differently for the same crime
of arson. These different sentences could include a ten-year penalty in some instances or a one-year penalty in others. Sentencing
38

The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, The
Controlled Substances Act of 1970, the establishment of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and The Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984 are what define drug crimes; Lisa N. Saco, Drug Enforcement
in the United States: History, Policy, and Trends, Congressional Research
Service, 2-8, (Mar. 7, 2020, 9:10 AM), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43749.pdf.

39

Id.

40

Legal Information Institute, Judicial Discretion, Cornell Law School (Feb.
27, 2020, 8:25 PM), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/judicial_discretion.

41

Statement of Michael J. Sullivan before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, House Committee on the Judiciary, July
14, 2009, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg51013/
html/CHRG-111hhrg51013.htm.
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disparity weakens or even eliminates whatever sentencing precedent
may exist. There are many reasons why a judge may use their discretion to order a sentence for an individual that isn’t commensurate
with the precedent. A judge‘s sentence might be influenced by their
own personal belief. Aggravated or mitigated sentences could also
be the result of the characteristics of the offender, such as the presence or lack of a criminal record, age, race, education, etc.
Sentencing disparity often carries a negative connotation. It has
been defined as “unequal treatment [in criminal punishment] that is
often of unexplained cause and is at least incongruous, unfair and
disadvantaging in consequence.”42 Critics of sentencing disparity
claim that it weakens the legal system by creating inconsistency in
how the law is enforced.43 If the public believes judges are taking
advantage of discretionary power, courts may become distrusted and
disrespected.44 Judges may be accused of racism if whites and blacks
receive different sentences after committing the same crime.45 Other
critics point out that judges could misuse their discretion to practically
let some people off the hook for crimes46 while severely punishing

42

Alfred Blumstein, Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform, 9,
Volume II, 1983.

43

Hans Zeisel & Shari Seldman Diamond, Sentencing Councils: A Study of
Sentence Disparity and its Reduction, University of Chicago Law School,
110, (Mar. 7, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=12072&context=journal_articles.

44

Id., at 111.

45

American Civil Liberties Union, Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Hearing on Reports of Racism in the Justice System of the United States, InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, 1, (Mar. 7, 2020, 10:04 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141027_iachr_racial_disparities_aclu_submission_0.pdf.

46

Ray Sanchez, Stanford rape case: Inside the court documents, CNN (Mar.
7, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/10/us/stanford-rape-case-courtdocuments/index.html.
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others. 47 Before the Anti-Drug Act was passed, sentencing disparity
in non-violent drug offenses was prominent. By establishing MMS,
the legislature addressed these concerns by reducing sentence disparity from 16% to 8% through the restriction of judicial discretion.48
However, it should be remembered that federal judges are
appointed and voted on before they take office. They are individuals
that have considerable legal experience and are trusted by a majority
of government officials to oversee that the law is appropriately realized. Like other government officials, judges are subject to removal
of office for abusing their power and office. They are not left free to
act however they please. Historically, only fifteen federal judges have
been impeached, and even fewer have been convicted and removed
from office. The reasons for impeachment included bribery, perjury,
intoxication on the bench, and, in two instances, favoritism towards
litigants.49 Although action to remove federal judges is extremely
rare, the existence of a removal process keeps judges accountable to
their oath to interpret the law to the best of their ability.
The implementation of MMS reduced sentencing disparity as
defined before. However, this was achieved at a significant cost:
judges could no longer consider disparities between individual
offenders. This often resulted in the imposition of overly harsh sentences. The stories of Johnny Patillo, Kemba Smith, and Brenda
Valencia illustrate this principle. Johnny Patillo was a 27-year-old
47

Josh Harkinson, 23 Petty Crimes That Have Landed People in Prison for
Life Without Parole: New ACLU report documents the disturbing growth
of endless sentences., Mother Jones (Mar. 7, 2020, 10:23 AM), https://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/11/23-petty-crimes-prison-life-without-parole/.

48

James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling, AND Kate Stith, Measuring
Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School
of Business, University of Chicago & The University of Chicago Law
School, 295, (Mar. 2, 2020 6:09 PM) https://www.jstor.org/stable/
pdf/10.1086/467426.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aaf7ab3fe2831fc53786359
af97c82508.

49

Federal Judicial Center, Impeachments of Federal Judges, Federal Judicial
Center (Mar. 9, 2020, 8:29 PM), https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
impeachments-federal-judges.
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African-American. He had obtained a college education and worked
a steady job. In 1992, he accepted a neighbor’s offer of $500 to deliver
a package containing illegal drugs to Texas. Patillo had no record
of prior criminal activity. The package which Patillo attempted to
deliver contained 681 grams of crack cocaine, which resulted in a
minimum sentence of ten-years without the possibility of parole.50
The sentencing judge called attention to the overwhelming effect
that the type of drug had on the sentence, stating “If the package contained a different narcotic, or a lesser quantity of the same substance,
[the] defendant might have been sentenced to straight probation.”51
While the crime of drug trafficking cannot go unpunished, a tenyear prison sentence for a first-time offender who was minimally
involved is excessive.52
The outcome of Patillo’s trial was not unique. Another individual similarly affected was Kemba Smith. At the age of 19, she fell
in love with Peter Hall, who was eight years older than Smith. After
moving in with Hall, Smith discovered he was an abusive partner.
Unbeknownst to Smith, he was also the leader of a multi-million
crack cocaine ring and was one of the FBI’s 15 most wanted. Smith
50

United States v. Patillo, 817 F. Supp. 839 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (On April 14,
1992, the defendant Johnny Patillo pled guilty to a single count indictment
that charged him with possession with intent to distribute approximately
680.7 grams of crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1988 and Supp. III
1991). On December 18, 1992, the court sentenced defendant, after orally
making findings that it was compelled to impose a mandatory minimum
sentence of ten-years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1988 and Supp.
III 1991). The Sentencing Guidelines called for a sentence of between 151
and 188 months (twelve years seven months to fifteen years), a range from
which the court found departure appropriate); U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California - 817 F. Supp. 839 (C.D. Cal. 1993), Justia
U.S. Law (Feb. 21, 2020), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/FSupp/817/839/1459460/.

51

United States v. Patillo, 817 F. Supp. 839 (C.D. Cal. 1993).

52

Paul Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering Mandatory Minimum Sentences: The
Arguments for and Against Potential Reforms, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 21, 2020, 11:33 PM), https://www.heritage.org/crime-andjustice/report/reconsidering-mandatory-minimum-sentences-the-arguments-and-against.
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made several attempts to leave Hall due to his physical and emotional abuse, but they were all unsuccessful.53 Later, Hall was found
murdered. The courts held Smith accountable for the total amount of
the drugs in his conspiracy charge. Smith testified before the Inter
American Commission on Human Rights in 2006 that, “I did not
traffic in drugs, but I knew my boyfriend did. I knew while living
with him that he did not have a job and we were living off of the
proceeds of his drug crimes. I never claimed total innocence and
this is the reason why I pled guilty.”54 Smith was sentenced to 24
years in prison. The fact that she only delivered the money to Hall’s
associates out of fear of her life, that she was a first-time offender,
that her relationship was abusive, or that she was being charged with
a non-violent crime did not matter. Similarly, Brenda Valencia’s life
was forever changed by MMS. When she was 19-years-old, Valencia drove her roommate’s stepmom to West Palm Beach to pick up
money from a cocaine dealer. The police raided the exchange, and
Brenda was taken into custody with the actual drug dealers.55 Brenda
had no previous record of breaking the law. She was charged with
cocaine conspiracy and received a sentence of 12 years and 7 months
in prison. This sentence is twice as many years as she would have
received if she had been convicted of manslaughter.56
J. Spencer Letts57 declared “Statutory mandatory minimum sentences create injustice because the sentence is determined without

53
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elsewhere.); Kemba Smith, The Sentencing Project (Feb. 22, 2020, 1:08
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looking at the particular defendant.”58 If MMS were nonexistent,
Judge Letts would have been able to give the sentence that best fit
the defendant based on all the facts and circumstances. In the case
of Johnny Patillo, the sentence could have reflected the fact that he
had no criminal record, was a college graduate, and held a job. Letts

58

Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Mandatory sentencing was once
America’s law-and-order panacea. Here’s why it’s not working., Families
Against Mandatory Minimums, 5, (Feb. 21, 2020, 11:47 PM). https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/famm/Primer.pdf.
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and many other judges59 claim that MMS strip them of their power
to correctly apply the law to unique individuals and situations. The
presiding judge in any given case will hear many facts that pertain
not only to the crime that was committed but also pertaining to the
defendant. Judges have a significant opportunity to better understand
the character, upbringing, and motives of the offender. Clearly, the presiding judge has an advantage in prescribing the correct punishment to
59

Lori Atherton, Federal Judge, Former US Attorney Discuss Mandatory
Minimum Sentences at Michigan Law, Michigan Law (Feb. 22, 2020,
12:49 AM), https://www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/features/Pages/Federal-Judge-Former-U.S.-Attorney-Discuss-Mandatory-Minimum-Sentences-at-Michigan-Law_112618.aspx. (‘The most sacred quality that judges
guard most is discretion, which is choice. Mandatory minimums take that
choice away from a judge. You’re obligated to follow the statute, and if
you don’t follow the statute, your decision is going to go to the court of
appeals and get reversed. And judges don’t like to have their decisions reversed.’ Avern Cohn, US District Judge); Rachel Martin, A Federal Judge
Says Mandatory Minimum Sentences Often Don’t Fit The Crime, NPR
(Feb. 22, 2020, 12:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/01/531004316/afederal-judge-says-mandatory-minimum-sentences-often-dont-fit-thecrime (’These mandatory minimums are so incredibly harsh, and they’re
triggered by such low levels of drugs that they snare at these non-violent,
low-level addicts who are involved in drug distribution mostly to obtain
drugs to feed their habit. They have a medical problem. It’s called addiction, and they’re going to be faced with five and 10 and 20-year and
sometimes life mandatory minimum sentences. I think that’s a travesty.‘
Mark Bennett, Federal Judge of Iowa); Kevin Sharp, Another Federal
Judge is Speaking Out against Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Mediam
(Feb. 22, 2020, 12:13 AM), https://medium.com/@civilrightsorg/anotherfederal-judge-is-speaking-out-against-mandatory-minimum-sentencese30301ad2211 (‘If there was any way I could have not given him life in
prison I would have done it,” said Kevin Sharp, the now-former federal
judge, recalling a sentencing hearing in 2014. “What they did was wrong,
they deserved some time in prison, but not life.’); Carimah Townes,
Federal Judge Calls Attorney General’s Mandatory Sentencing Decision
‘Bad Policy’, The Apeal (Feb. 22, 2020, 12:43 AM), https://theappeal.org/
federal-judge-calls-attorney-generals-mandatory-sentencing-decision-badpolicy-489786fa8562/. (‘There are many, many horror stories about the
application of mandatory minimums to defendants who really should not
have gone to prison for as long as they did... I think it’s bad policy to take
the discretion away from trial court judges.’ Judge William Smith Chief
US District Court).
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the offender. Regardless, the prison time is determined by a group of
congressmen who will never meet the individual defendants nor hear
the distinct circumstances accompanying each case.
Patillo, Smith, and Valencia are just a few of the thousands of
people that have suffered many years in prison for their minimum
involvement in a non-violent drug offense.60 None of these aforementioned defendants had a criminal record. We would expect the
safety valve provision to have applied in each of these cases. Instead,
the defendant’s complete lack of a criminal history in no way
decreased their sentence, illustrating how impersonal mandatory
minimum sentencing laws have made the judicial system. punishments. Although it has been expanded,61 the safety valve provision
is simply not efficient in ensuring low-level offenders are exempted
from long, harsh punishments.62 Only completely repealing MMS
will protect people like Patillo, Smith, and Valencia from spending
years in prison.
Under MMS, judges are unable to consider disparities between
different drug offenders and are forced at times to give the same sentence to first-time offenders and hardened drug dealers alike.63 Furthermore, one of the only reasons a judge can mitigate a MMS is if the
offender cooperates by trading information or aiding in the arrest of
60
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www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/07/25/mandatory-minimum-sentencesdecline-sentencing-commission-says. (“The number of federal prison
inmates convicted under mandatory minimum laws decreased by 14 percent from 2010 to 2016, although they still make up more than half of all
federal inmates, according to a new report by the United States Sentencing
Commission.”).
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a different individual. Low-level offenders, such as Ron Miller, often
do not have information to trade because they are barely involved.
This results in dealers and high-level offenders often because they
trade information for a lower sentence. A judicial system that may
result in a first-time offender spending a decade or more in prison
while drug kingpins barely see time behind bars is seriously flawed.
Once the drug type and quantity have been identified, the “correct” sentence could be given by any person who can read a chart,
and there no longer exists a need for a judge. This impersonality in
sentencing can lead to excessive amounts of time spent in prison,
particularly for first time offenders. The elimination of MMS is necessary to empower the judiciary to punish criminals while ensuring
the sentence is appropriate for the individual offender.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion
An unintended consequence of mandatory minimum sentences was
the transition of discretionary power from judges to prosecutors.64
The judicial branch was designed to be impartial and unbiased,
ensuring fair trials and a proper interpretation of the law. Conversely, prosecutors have every incentive to see defendants found
guilty and sentenced to serve time in prison. By restricting a judge’s
ability to use discretion in sentencing, their role in a criminal trial
is limited to determining what evidence the jury may hear by ruling
on objections, and sentencing after the jury has ruled. On the other
hand, prosecutors exercise their discretion throughout the proceedings of a criminal trial, including the decision of what charges are
pressed against the defendant. It is true that judicial discretion is not
entirely impartial or unbiased. Similarly, prosecutorial discretion is
not without its own faults. In the late 1970s, a law professor claimed
that prosecutorial discretion is “commonly exercised for the purpose
of obtaining convictions in cases in which guilt could not be proven
at trial,” “usually exercised by people of less experience and less
64

Rachel E. Barkow, The Problem With Mandatory Minimum Sentences,
The New York Times (Mar. 9, 2020, 4:30 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2012/08/19/do-prosecutors-have-too-much-power/theproblem-with-mandatory-minimum-sentences.
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objectivity than judges,” and “commonly exercised on the basis of
less information than judges possess.”65
The following example exhibits prosecutorial discretion in
action. A man is arrested and charged for two different drug offenses,
respectively carrying a ten and twenty-year MMS. A prosecutor
might cut a deal with the defendant, offering to drop the charges on
the offense carrying a twenty year sentence on the condition that he
plead guilty on the charge carrying a ten-year sentence. If the defendant accepts the deal and pleads guilty the first offense, he will be
sentenced to ten-years in prison without being judged by a jury of
their peers. Because the average sentence for a federal drug defendant who pleads guilty is five years and four months, while defendants that go to trial receive an average sentence of 16 years,66 many
defendants feel they cannot afford the risk of taking their case to
trial. Prosecutors are extremely proficient at obtaining guilty pleas;
currently, only 3% of federal drug defendants go to trial.67 These
conversations between defendants and prosecutors happen behind
closed doors, leaving prosecutors free to use coercive tactics to elicit
guilty pleas from defendants without any oversight.
The lack of transparency when prosecutorial discretion is exercised is very concerning.68 Contrarily, when a judge exercises their
judicial discretion, it is a matter of public record. Every decision a
judge makes during a legal proceeding is made manifest for scrutiny
or praise, resulting in judges being considerably more accountable
65
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when using discretion than are prosecutors. Whatever the reason justifying the restriction of judicial discretion may be, placing
unchecked discretionary power in the hands of those with the most
to gain from a trial resulting in a prison sentence is not the solution. MMS must be repealed before discretionary power can be put
back into the hands of those best equipped to use it objectively and
responsibly, the judges.
D. The Federal Prison Problem
Despite recent reforms, more than half of all prison inmates are convicted under Mandatory Minimum Sentences.69 From 1980 to 2014,
the incarceration rate in the United States grew 220%70, despite the
fact that crime rates fell significantly over this same time period.71
Although MMS are just one element in the increase in incarceration rates, they are an incredibly significant one.72 In contrast, the
primary elements of the incarceration boom were ”changes in the
severity of sentencing and enforcement.73
A primary reason that MMS were put into effect was to act as
a deterrent against crime.74 Since MMS have been enacted, extensive research has been conducted to measure their effectiveness in
69
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stopping crime. It is estimated that a 10% increase in average sentence length corresponds to a zero to 0.5% decrease in arrest rates.75
Additionally, MMS may result in increased recidivism rates. Other
research has found that for every year added to a sentence, the average rate of re-arrest for that crime goes up by 4-7%.76 Currently,
nearly half of all offenders who serve a prison sentence are behind
bars again within eight years.77 As prison populations increase, it
becomes increasingly difficult for the basic health and safety needs
of prisoners to be met. In prisons, rates of human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV) are 5–28 times higher
than in the general population, respectively.78 Based on the latest
national figures available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
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4,980 prisoners in US correctional facilities died in 2014.79 Additionally, 24,661 inmates were raped in 2015.80
Longer sentences for non-violent drug offenders are excessively
harsh and ineffective punishments. Since the implementation of
MMS, the number of prisoners has risen to a point where the US
now detains nearly 25% of the world’s prisoners.81 This quantity of
prisoners equates to a massive fiscal cost for the United States. The
incarceration expenditures of the criminal justice system82 approach
$80 billion.83 US citizens are forced to finance a flawed prison system that is not deterring future crime. Since poor living conditions
resulting from mass incarceration84 could potentially explain the
failure of prisons to rehabilitate offenders and decrease recidivism
79
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rates, action to reduce inmate overpopulation is necessary. Repealing MMS would dramatically decrease prison populations. With
fewer inmates to accommodate, prison conditions could be drastically improved. Furthermore, the US would save billions of dollars
that could be invested in other reformative programs to deter future
crimes and rehabilitate offenders.

III. Proposal
There is a fear that following the repeal of MMS, the judiciary would
possess virtually unchecked discretionary power. Judges would be
free to rule as they please, sentencing in accordance with their personal preferences. It is true that each judge is unique. Pertinent facts
and circumstances of each case will influence each particular judge’s
sentence differently. Disparity, for better or worse, will certainly
exist when judges may exercise discretion while sentencing. However, we propose a safeguard that could keep judges from exercising judicial discretion to push a personal agenda. We acknowledge
that this is perhaps not a perfect solution. Regardless, alternatives to
MMS need to be put forth and considered.
Federal sentencing guidelines play a key role in our proposal.
However, as they now exist, the guidelines are quite similar to MMS
in the amount of time a convicted offender will spend in prison.
Comprehensive reform of the guidelines is necessary before they will
effectively aid judges in determining the correct sentence for individuals. No suggestions for new guidelines will be discussed in this
paper, but rather a broad reformative process will be briefly outlined.
The current sentencing guidelines should be completely eliminated. The legislature and the USSC have access to an abundance
of data on types of drug offenders, effects of current prison sentences, recidivism rates, the success of non-incarceratory programs,
and more. Using this data, Congress can determine reasonable standards based on the offense, level of involvement, and criminal history of the offender. As the new guidelines are implemented, data
will be gathered indicating whether they are leading to the successful rehabilitation of drug offenders. The results of situations where
judges have departed from the guidelines will also be taken into
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consideration. These new guidelines will ideally be subject to reform
every few years. Over time, Congress would approach guidelines
that suggest sentences with a strong track record of rehabilitating
the offender and deterring future crimes. Since the guidelines are
not mandatory,85 they would give judges a reasonable starting point
when determining a sentence. If a judge makes an extreme departure
from what the guidelines suggest, this could be cause for a prosecutor or defendant to appeal86 the sentence to a higher court.

IV. Looking Forward
Throughout history, Congress has passed mandatory minimum sentences to curb public fears. In 1986, the Anti-Drug Act was enacted
in response to extreme drug abuse. Now, over 30 years later, MMS
have stripped judges of judicial discretion, placed that discretion in
the hands of prosecutors, and significantly inflated the federal prison
population. Under our proposal, reformed federal sentencing guidelines would play a key role in allowing judges to exercise judicial discretion while maintaining the integrity of the judicial system. While
we recognize this is not a perfect solution, action must be taken. Our
reform would put sentencing power back in the hands of the judiciary
and make a necessary step towards mitigating drug offenses.
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